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Suspicious Silence: Walking Out on John Cage
Clark Lunberry
“What we require is silence; but what silence requires is that I go on 
talking.”
-John Cage, “Lecture on Nothing”
“Well, shall we / think or listen? Is there a sound addressed / not wholly 
to the ear?”
-William Carlos Williams, “The Orchestra”
“South, south which is a wind is not rain, does silence choke speech or 
does it not.”
-Gertrude Stein, Tender Buttons
Critical Innocence: 2012 marked what would have been the composer and 
writer John Cage’s 100th birthday, offering a nice round numbered moment 
to commemorate and reevaluate Cage’s lasting legacy. And it is a rich and 
still, astonishingly, controversial legacy, bringing forth bold assessments 
of Cage that range, as they have for decades, from worshipful acclaim, to 
ridiculing rejection. It seems with Cage, still, that it’s either black or white, 
love or hate; that he is either a saintly prophet of new sounds, new silences, 
or a foolish charlatan leading anarchically astray.
Of late, however, one reads more and more critical accounts of Cage that, 
while acknowledging his wide-ranging influence and importance, suggest 
nonetheless of him a deafening innocence to his own renowned hearing. A 
new generation of writers and listeners, one that is perhaps more theoretically 
inclined and less reverential of the composer’s acclaim, have begun to raise 
questions about what they perceive as the unexamined dimensions of some 
of Cage’s claims about silence, the nature of the nothing that was thought 
to have constituted it. Cage, as a consequence, is now often more mystically 
presented as somewhat naively espousing a kind of zen-like syncing of a scene 
with a sound, with its immediate moment. Also, this more recent critique 
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asserts of Cage a certain silencing of inconvenient sounds, sounds incom-
patible with, in particular, his own well established story of silence; some 
have even characterized Cage’s silence as, politically and ontologically, an 
antiseptic one “which exclude[s] the world and its cultural noise” (Brophy). 
And how simple, or simple-minded, others say, to seek, as Cage so often 
said he sought, out of the silence, his silence, the sound of “sound in itself ”; 
or to listen for the present of such self-present moments of “here and now,” 
when we all now so knowingly know that the various mediations of “there 
and then,” those “continuously compounded” intrusions upon immediate 
thought by thought’s own “memory and expectation,” so certainly prohibit 
our accessing any such punctually present sound, at any such present site, 
heard as here, heard as now. 
But, of Cage’s listening innocence, what might we make of these many 
reasoned, even reasonable, suspicions that are directed toward him, of such 
aspersions onto the foundational stories of sound and silence that Cage so 
often told? How are we to reconcile Cage’s stated desire for “sound in itself,” 
heard instantaneously “here and now,” with what is—in theory—increasingly 
understood as a more dense and dispersed event of sound that, temporally 
spreading-out, is always elsewhere and already other than where we look, 
where we listen? How are we to hear, one wonders, any such present sounds, 
silent or otherwise, which (if they are to be heard at all) are often now 
thoughtfully rendered as acoustically thicker in their very thinking, in their 
having been thought? Resounding, re-sounding, such sounds now echo 
absently elsewhere in their rich range of references that, simultaneously 
superimposed, constitute them.
My suspicion (from one who has long admired and learned from Cage) 
is that many of the more recent attributions of a certain critical innocence 
to Cage, of his being in a kind of deafening denial to his own repressions of 
sound, have often failed to see, or hear, how cagey Cage could actually be, 
and how smart his innocence, such that it was, has finally proven to be. And 
of such self-present hearing of the “here and now,” it was Derrida who noted, 
in his own Husserlian study of the mythically sought “punctuality of the 
instant,” that “the present of self-presence is not simple” (61). Nor, I believe, 
is John Cage’s similar seeming to seek of a self-present sound “in itself,” 
“here and now,” all that “simple” either, nor all that mythical (or mystical, 
for that matter), as some have recently seemed to suggest. For Cage, in the 
vast and rich range of his resounding work, has consistently and deliberately 
confused most notions of sound and the self, and of the present, of a self that 
might be self-presently present to sound—a self that is, positioned as such, 
neither here, nor there, neither now, nor then; absent. As Cage reportedly 
said to the painter Philip Guston, “When you start working, everybody is 
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in your studio—the past, your friends, enemies, the art world, and above 
all, your own ideas—all are there. But as you continue, they start leaving 
one by one, and you are left completely alone. Then, if you are lucky, even 
you leave” (Mayer 171). 
And lucky for us, prompted by the present punctuality of Cage’s own 
2012 centenary—with Cage, now unliving, and so, himself, neither here, nor 
there—having left—perhaps we should now, once again, listen more closely 
to him (though perhaps listening not to his often obscuring legacy), listening 
more closely to all that Cage was always asking us to listen closely to and for 
. . . . a listening, appropriately, that starts anew with silence. 
Enchambered Music: Cage famously and repeatedly offered two related 
scenarios of his own encountering of silence, and of his subsequent awareness 
of the absence of sound, or the absence of the absence of sound: the first of 
these arose from his time, in the late 1940’s, inside an anechoic chamber. 
Such a technological space has been described as “a room designed to 
absorb any and all sound waves, to diffuse any echoes or reverberation, 
making it as close to silent (or ‘dead’, in the parlance of audio engineers) as 
possible” (Kim-Cohen 160). Once inside this chamber, Cage was reportedly 
startled, not by the anticipated silences encountered therein, but instead by 
the mysterious and unexpected continuation of two specific sounds—“one 
high and one low”—contained in this purportedly “dead” space. Cage wrote 
about what proved to be such a seminal experience for him, in his 1962 
book Silence, the following: “When I described [these two sounds later] to 
the engineer in charge, he informed me that the high one was my nervous 
system in operation, the low one my blood in circulation. Until I die there 
will be sounds. And they will continue following my death” (8). While still 
alive inside the anechoic chamber, Cage had clearly realized that, contrary 
to expectation and intention (i.e., his seeking of silence), there was, in fact, 
as he later stated “no such thing as silence,” at least as long as the living body 
is there to listen for it. Heard instead, inescapably and without intention, 
are the constant, polymorphous variations of life-confirming noises already 
filling the ear or preceding even the ear’s finest receptions; hearing before 
(and after) the ear has even heard. 
However, there are some who have recently claimed that Cage, in the 
anechoic chamber, must have refused to acknowledge, by silencing himself, 
a “third internal sound” (in addition to the two physiological ones) in which 
he surely, internally asked, “Hmmm, wonder what that low-pitched sound is? 
What’s that high-pitched sound?” (Kahn 190). In other words, the suspicion 
is that inside the chamber Cage, in the service of a pre-selected narrative, 
was silencing thought, repressing a “discursive” and interpretive mode of 
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listening that, it’s believed, would have been “antithetical to Cagean listening 
by being in competition with sounds in themselves” (Kahn 190). 
And yet I wonder if it’s fair or even accurate to suggest that, inside the 
chamber, Cage did not hear this “third internal sound” of discursive thought, 
of his own quiet questioning. For, indeed, Cage did ask the very questions that 
are assumed to have been repressed by him, of “Hmmm, wonder what” those 
sounds are, to the sound engineer once having walked out of the chamber. 
As Herbert Blau noted, “Cage listened to his nerves and heart, then thought 
of himself listening” (248). As a result of such thought, such thoughtful 
listening, instead of these discursive sounds being necessarily “antithetical 
to Cagean listening” and in “competition with sounds in themselves,” might 
such sounds have been heard by Cage as vital, constituting components of 
“sounds themselves,” a music of the discursive mind, even, a poetry of its 
interpretive processes, and as additional echoing nuances of worded sound 
moving through or alongside the purring and pulsating of the body’s blood 
and nervous system? 
The second and even better known of Cage’s scenarios of silence, one 
that perhaps emerges from and echoes out of the first, is his now legend-
ary noteless composition for piano 4’33” in which, at its 1952 premier, the 
virtuoso pianist David Tudor sat silently, never touching the piano’s keys; 
heard in its place, however, was a composition in “three movements” that 
was, as Cage later described, “full of accidental sounds” (Kostelanetz 70) 
that were gradually brought to one’s attention from both within and outside 
the performance space by the silencing of the piano. Among the sounds 
reportedly heard were the anxious noises of those in the audience growing 
restless, their murmurs and movements, their whisper of words incited by 
the absence of sound, its awkward non-silence.
These two enchambered settings, in spite of their radically different 
contexts (the first, technological; the second, conventionally musical), share 
within them a discovered awareness of silence’s absence and the unintended 
emergence of indeterminate sound. As Cage noted, “There is no such thing 
as an empty space or an empty time. There is always something to see, 
something to hear. In fact, try as we may to make a silence, we cannot” (8). 
For instance, in the first chamber, the anechoic one, try as we might to locate 
silence, enter emptiness, there was the deliberate silencing of the world 
beyond the chamber’s thickly insulated walls and the subsequent interior 
consciousness of interior sounds, both physiological and, I believe, discur-
sive, heard within the living body; in the second chamber, the setting for 
4’33”, there was, by stark contrast, a deliberate silencing of all of the interior 
bodies of those in the audience, as they, according to the conventions of a 
concert hall, were expected to sit passively while actively listening, not to 
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their own living bodies, but to the living world noisily resounding around 
them both between and beyond the room’s echoing walls, from windows 
and doors left open. 
Just as silence had proved absent from the anechoic chamber, so was 
it absent from the concert hall that night, as if Cage’s silenced piano, and 
its passive pianist, had incited (or made room for) the very active, external 
sounds of its non-silent setting, the component parts of 4’33”’s indeterminate 
composition. For in the first two movements of that piece there were, as Cage 
noted, the outside “accidental” sounds of “stirring” wind and then “pattering” 
raindrops, which became then in the third movement the living bodies of 
those restless in the room, “interesting” sounds, as Cage humorously, perhaps 
ironically characterized them, of people “talk[ing] and walk[ing] out.”
Walking Out: And so it is, still, from such scenarios as Cage’s two encham-
bered settings that others have continued to walk out on Cage, but now often 
for quite different reasons. If before, with 4’33”, for instance, the departure 
was caused by what might be snidely construed as a kind of philistine’s 
frustration, or, on the other hand, perhaps a more high-minded sense of 
aesthetic violation—there being nothing there to listen to—more recently, 
and critically, the departure is more likely caused by the silent suspicion that 
there is, in Cage’s case, not nothing, but too much there, or too much claimed, 
selectively claimed, by Cage for the living immediacy of un-represented 
sensation, the “sound itself ” of a particular moment, heard “here and now.”
However, both before and now, perhaps too many have “walked out” too 
soon on Cage, listening too simply, or too suspiciously, to his silences, and to 
what Cage repeatedly said of these silences. For might it be precisely there, 
at the punctual point of one’s walking out, that Cage’s plot has theoretically 
thickened, and where his own proposed listening most richly begins to 
extend beyond itself, extending beyond even Cage’s own expectations and 
descriptions of sound and silence, and the absence of each? Might even a 
kind of acoustic threshold onto absence have been crossed over, walked over, 
while walking out, and where, just when you think you’ve heard it all, you 
realize there’s far more there than meets the immediate ear? For as Cage 
noted: “ . . . our experiences, gotten as they are all at once, pass beyond our 
understanding” (194).
In keeping with this image of one’s “walking out,” let’s recall that it 
was Cage, walking out of the anechoic chamber, who carried with him the 
discursive questions arising from the physiological noises heard from within, 
the “Hmmm, wonder what” those sounds are questions, in which language 
engages sensation and seeks explanation, its words integrating within or 
upon “sounds themselves,” and where, as Cage quite explicitly wrote of 
Current Musicology
12
language’s inevitable involvements in sound, “the words make / help make 
/ the silences . . . ” (109). At such a moment of wonder, though, it’s perhaps 
little wonder that, having entered the chamber seeking silence, even Cage’s 
own premeditated expectations had on that day in some ways “walked out” 
on him, while he, largely unresisting of the intrusions and the departure of 
his earlier idea, was finally left alone with his lost thoughts, his initial ideas 
of silence unlocated and unfulfilled; or as Cage later stated, “No one can 
have an idea once he really starts listening” (191). Or certainly not a single 
idea, a fixed idea, enduring and unchanging. 
There was, of course, another, earlier description of a different scene 
of departure, another moment of “walk[ing] out” for Cage, but this one 
came from Cage’s earlier anecdote of the artist in his studio, surrounded 
by “friends, enemies, the art world, and above all, your own ideas.” In that 
setting, the departures described were presented as a kind of necessary 
evacuation or emptying out of—I suppose—ego, cultural noise, a conceptual 
clearing of one’s clutter, the clutter of one’s consciousness, and where finally 
“you are left completely alone. Then, if you are lucky, even you leave.” It is 
as if, with this story, Cage is consciously concluding that one must absent 
oneself, or find oneself absented, getting out of the way of, “walking out” 
on, that which is otherwise being blocked by one’s own habits of thought, 
habits of listening, even by one’s own habits of suspicion toward listening’s 
capacity to keep an open ear.
After all, in both the anechoic chamber and with 4’33”, the indetermi-
nate sounds encountered in each clearly resonated from both within and 
beyond the sounds of the two sites themselves, signaling much more than 
simply the singularity of acoustic texture, more than merely the punctually 
present point of any particular sound. Cage’s subsequent listening to the 
respective absences of silence was thus understood by him to have effectively 
interrupted and intruded upon any unencumbered or facile immediacies 
of “here and now.” From this new position outside of his own premeditated 
expectations—where Cage, in a sense, had walked out on Cage—while he 
may have begun by seeking out silences in the anechoic chamber or 4’33”’s 
concert hall, he nonetheless inadvertently and indeterminately uncovered 
in their place moments of mediated separation from such silence, their 
own time-intersecting echoes, time-delayed traces delineated . . . . and the 
absent sound of that. 
Response Ability: In an early essay where Cage first speaks of letting “sound 
be themselves,” he expands upon the mind’s interpretive mediations and 
considerably complicates that which is often construed more simply, more 
innocently, less theoretically, of his listening. For Cage, in fact, embraces 
Clark Lunberry
13
the ways in which discursive intrusions are not to be separated from sound, 
repressed from one’s listening, but instead heard as richly and inevitably con-
stituting it. He writes: “Hearing sounds which are just sounds immediately 
sets the theorizing mind to theorizing . . . .” Cage goes on to offer personal 
instances of sounds in nature resounding theoretically elsewhere:
Does not a mountain intentionally evoke a sense of wonder? . . . .  
night in the woods a sense of fear?.... Is not decaying flesh loathsome?  
Does not the death of someone we love bring sorrow? . . What is more  
angry than the flash of lightning and the sound of thunder?
Cage concludes this description, indicating:
These responses to nature are mine and will not necessarily correspond  
with another’s. Emotion takes place in the person who has it. And sounds,  
when allowed to be themselves, do not require that those who hear them 
do so unfeelingly. (10)
Nor, one might add is one required to hear such sounds unthinkingly 
either, without the interpretive “theoretical” mediations that, for Cage, finally 
imply a listener’s “response ability” (10), one’s ability to respond at all.
However, in what is becoming a kind of contemporary chorus of Cagean 
criticism, another recently voiced critique of Cage’s silence and sound, and 
what is seen as his suspiciously selective listening, has suggested that, in his 
discriminations or repressions of inconvenient sounds, Cage “fail[ed] to real-
ize a fundamental thought [that] sound is bigger than hearing” (Kim-Cohen 
167), and that there is a “non-cochlear,” conceptual component to one’s 
listening. Again, though, I’m not so sure that Cage, so innocently presented, 
“failed” to realize that, how fundamentally big sound could be, and how the 
ear’s spiraling cochlea were indeed—like a jetty spiraling into a great salt 
lake—mediating channels leading directly to the discursive brain. For Cage 
always acknowledged the indeterminate density and immensity of sound, 
and the limits of our ability to actually hear it (as well as our responsibility to 
the limits of our own listening, to that which cannot be heard by the naked 
ear); in addition, Cage was well aware of the mind’s own interpretive impera-
tive when confronted by sound and the subsequent discursive and theoretical 
impulse that was, not necessarily disrupted, but linguistically enlivened by 
sound, and that, as Cage himself noted of silence, “required” him to “go on 
talking”; indeed, for Cage the materially and conceptually compounded 
echoes extending beyond any such sought silences—“the nature of these,” 
Cage noted, being “unpredictable and changing . . . .” (22)—inescapably 
moved the listening mind immediately into its own mediation of memory 
and anticipation, of linguistic/poetic formulation and conceptual contempla-
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tion, out of the self-presence of “here and now” and into the non-presence of 
“there and then,” with these two tenses coalescing toward the formation of 
any perception at all. “Our poetry now is that we possess nothing . . . .,” Cage 
famously wrote, “We need not destroy the past: it is gone; at any moment 
it might reappear and seem to be and be the present” (Emphasis mine 110). 
Possessing nothing, the past, the present, both entangled and superimposed, 
any such sound now seeming to be and being the present.
Superimpositions: In a conversation between John Cage and his friend and 
fellow composer Morton Feldman, recorded for radio broadcast in 1966, 
Feldman anecdotally recounted a recent visit of his to the beach and his an-
noyance at encountering there “transistor radios . . . .blaring out rock n’roll” 
(254). Feldman lamented that, what he called, these “intrusions on [his] 
life” had prevented him from the peace and quiet that he had presumably 
sought at the beach, or, from the sounds, there, that he may have hoped to 
hear . . . .birds, waves, wind . . . silence . . . .a space to think his own thoughts 
. . . .who knows? Whichever it was, Feldman felt as if he were being held 
captive by the annoying noises, obliged to “surrender” to them against his 
wishes or his will.
Aside from the somewhat distressing mental image of Morton Feldman 
in swimming trunks, and, even more, the ironic fact that this conversation 
with Cage was recorded and perhaps heard later by some on “transistor 
radios” (maybe even heard at the beach!), Feldman’s frustration caused 
by hearing the unwelcome and interrupting noise of the radio prompted 
Cage to interrogate further the experience of “intrusion” that his friend 
had just described. Characteristically, Cage gently counseled Feldman not 
to “surrender,” but to embrace such radiophonic intrusion, “to listen to it 
with pleasure,” “attend to” it, he said, “pay attention and become interested” 
in it. In a typically understated display of his own theoretical orientation 
and sophistication, Cage then elaborated upon how, by changing one’s way 
of thinking, one might come to enjoy and appreciate such sounds as those 
heard at the beach, or elsewhere, insisting: “Well, what it is that you are 
interested in is what superimposes what. What happens at the same time 
together with what happens before and what happens after.”
To Cage’s suggestion that Feldman alter or enlarge his way of hearing, 
paying attention to the superimpositions of sound—“what happens before 
and what happens after”—there is the clear assertion that, for Cage, one 
might be able to listen for more than those sounds immediately present, more 
than simply “the sounds themselves.” As Cage then explains to Feldman, 
offering the radio as a device for the reception of such superimposed sound:
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 . . . all that radio is, Morty, is making available to your ears what was already 
in the air and available to your ears but you couldn’t hear it. In other words, all it 
is, is making audible something which you are already in. You are bathed 
in radio waves—TV, broadcasts, probably telepathic messages, from other 
minds . . . And this radio simply makes audible something that you thought 
was inaudible. (19)
Perhaps somewhat like the poet Jack Spicer’s own image of the radio 
receiving transmissions from outer space, from “Martians” and “the invisible 
world,” Cage presents here a radically new, if entirely earthly, conception 
of listening, one that encompasses and involves, in addition to a more 
immediate or positive listening, a kind of negative listening as well, or an 
anti-hearing, of non-perceptions superimposed upon perceptions; as such, 
the sounds, as Cage here presents them . . . .redefines them, might then be 
heard to extend beyond themselves as sounds themselves, into absence, 
before and after any actual event of sound: in time, out of time, immediate, 
and immediately mediated; or, as Derrida would later famously describe, 
in ways not unrelated to sound and the presence of sound:
. . . the presence of the perceived present can appear as such only inasmuch 
as it is continuously compounded with a nonpresence and nonperception, 
with primary memory and expectation (retention and protention). The 
nonperceptions are neither added to, nor do they occasionally accompany, 
the actually perceived now; they are essentially and indispensably involved 
in its possibility . . . . a perceiving in which the perceived is not a present 
but a past existing as a modification of the present. (64)
For Derrida, these “nonperceptions” are not, for all intents and purposes, 
non-perceptions at all, for, rolled up into one, and inseparable, they make 
possible, they constitute, perception as perception, the two tenses and tex-
tures of sound, both their presence and absence, entangled in perception’s 
very formation.
However, to Cage’s far-reaching suggestion to Morton Feldman of a 
more expansive form of superimposed listening, Feldman replied, troubled 
by the very thought of what Cage was proposing, and in as close to a 
personal rebuke of Cage as Feldman would ever come, that “At the same 
time, I mean just simply stated, I can’t conceive of some brat turning on a 
transistor radio in my face and [my] say[ing], ‘Ah! The environment” (19). 
Feldman went on to even more delicately counter or question Cage (implying 
perhaps that Cage even shared some characteristics with such a “brat” at the 
beach) with his suggestion that, even if he were to try and listen for such 
superimpositions of sound, that “I can’t think unless thought is something 
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of the past,” acknowledging thought’s inevitable and enabling precedence 
to the very thinking of thought. 
However, in Cage’s affirmation of sound’s superimpositions, he wasn’t 
here asking Feldman simply, or merely, to think, to think about the sounds 
of the radio heard at the beach; for Cage was suggesting instead that it 
was perhaps thinking, or certain kind of “deep” thinking that they had just 
discussed—the image of it, the self-image of it—that was part of the problem, 
and that this kind of thought itself was largely creating the staticky interfer-
ence to a more temporally dispersed form of hearing, a listening that is 
corporally as well as cerebrally engaged, a thinking in time, through the body, 
that includes a discursive awareness of what’s to be heard without allowing 
that discursiveness to deafen the sounds around, to entirely dominate the 
scene. Cage later states to Feldman the following of such a superimposed 
listening in motion: 
I guess in my case that it goes out of thought into experience . . . .[and] that 
we can be, not just with our minds, but with our whole being, responsive 
to sound, and that sound doesn’t have to be the communication of some 
deep thought. They can be just sound. Now that sound could go in one ear 
and out the other, or it could go in one ear, permeate the being, transform 
the being, and then perhaps go out, letting the next one in (both laugh). 
And then whether an idea developed . . . you know, the hardest thing in 
the world, of course, is to have a head without any ideas in it. (27)
To this affirmation of absence, and to what is, as Cage characterizes it, 
the “hardest thing in the world,” Feldman appears to concede the point of 
the value of the empty head, responding, “But that’s always the best work, 
you know? Always was” (27). 
Feldman elsewhere wrote, in a manner directly related to the absence of 
sound, and of mediated listening, that “We do not hear what we hear . . . ., 
only what we remember.” To which Cage, concurring, would likely counter, 
yes, but we might nonetheless hear that, remembrance, as if, once-removed, 
the remembered sounds, even the anticipated sounds, decayed and soon 
decaying, dead and soon to die, might somehow be made nonetheless to 
emerge and return (in some ghostly, radiophonic manner), to sound, perhaps 
inaudibly, in their own resounding absence. 
Sound Conclusions: Such compacted densities of superimposed sound—
Cage’s interest in “what superimposes what. What happens at the same 
time together with what happens before and what happens after”—listened 
to closely in all its phenomenological “thickness,” disperse into a range 
of radiating references that Cage fully understood could not be traced or 
tracked down, located in any one site, and certainly not onto any single site 
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or source of sound. While the one listening, also dispersed and divided by the 
densities and indeterminacies of the acoustic event, might—as if “present at 
[one’s] own absence” (Beckett 27)—walk away from the scene, as if walking 
out on oneself, vanishing through the very efforts to hear anything at all, 
and where, like the artist and the studio, “if you are lucky, even you leave,” 
becoming in the process, if only for a moment, that which both Feldman 
and Cage had agreed was the “hardest thing in the world”: “a head without 
any ideas in it.” For silence itself had been vividly demonstrated to Cage and 
by Cage as being complexly intersected by the rich and noisy range of these 
intrusions and interruptions that are involved in simply being alive, by the 
multiplicities of their continuously compounded sounds. 
And it is in large part thanks to Cage that the windows of the concert hall, 
the windows onto the world—to a life intently and responsively lived—these 
windows are now more widely open. As a result, there’s no telling what might 
finally be heard from them. As Cage noted: “ . . . the composer resembles 
the maker of a camera who allows someone else to take the picture” (11). 
While as such a composer, perhaps Cage’s most important compositional 
act, as well as the most enduring and valuable part of his legacy, are his 
expansive and liberating lessons in listening and the fact that he certainly 
never told us what we were and were not to listen to—internally, externally, 
physiologically, discursively—as all sounds are now equally available, those 
heard and perhaps even more delicately those that remain unheard, absent.
Morton Feldman, in a follow-up radio conversation with Cage, movingly 
stated that “I know that when I write a piece [of music], sometimes I’m telling 
people, ‘We’re not gonna be here very long’” (143). Of Feldman’s poignant 
and elegiac claim for his music, one might imagine Cage nonetheless af-
firmatively responding that such a life, however long, if lived attentively, 
would be long enough . . . offering each of us just the right amount of time 
to hear, superimposed, what’s there to be heard, and not heard, see what’s 
there to be seen, and not seen, and in the process to be awakened, as Cage 
described elsewhere, “to the very life that we’re living” (12).
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